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I.
INTRODUCTION
This case is about the authority and obligation of the Director of the Idaho State
Police, Alcohol Beverage Control ("ISP") to award attorney fees under LC. 12-117 to a
"prevailing party," when the "non-prevailing party" acted without a reasonable basis in
fact or law. The Hearing Officer declined to award attorney fees based upon this Court's
ruling in Ramm ell v. Idaho State Dept. ofAgriculture, 147 Idaho 415 (2009). The
Director, in his Final Order, responding to Rammell, acknowledged the legislative
amendment to LC. 12-117. But, he declined to award attorney fees to either party, ruling
that neither party had prevailed. After Daniel S. Fuchs dba Aubrey's House of Ale
("Fuchs") petitioned for judicial review, without the Parties having raised the issue, the
District Court held that Fuchs had no substantial rights to attorney fees as required by LC.
67-5279(4). It also held that the Director had not abused his discretion in finding that
Fuchs was not the "prevailing party."
In December, 2010, this Court issued its opinion in Smith v. Washington County,
150 Idaho 388 (2010), which held that LC. 12-117, as amended, does not provide
authority for an award of attorney fees in "administrative judicial proceedings."
Accordingly, Fuchs has not sought attorney fees and costs incurred in pursuing his
Petition for Judicial Review to the District Court or on appeal to this Court. However,
Fuchs is requesting that this Court reverse the District Court's Decision on Appeal, which
affirmed the Director's Final Order denying attorney fees to Fuchs. The Director abused
his discretion in finding that Fuchs was not the prevailing party, as such a finding was
clearly erroneous. LC. 67-5279(3); State ex rel. Richardson v. Pierandozzi, 117 Idaho 1,
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF
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4 (1989). Moreover, ISP acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law, pursuing license
revocation without articulating any clear standards, without promulgating a new or
amended rule regarding "actual sales" and in violation of the Idaho Constitution.
Furthermore, ISP does not dispute that Fuchs was the "prevailing party" in the
proceeding before the Director of the Idaho State Police. ISP does not dispute that
Fuchs' right to seek attorney fees is a "substantial right" meeting the requirements of LC.
67-5279( 4). Accordingly, ISP has waived these issues on appeal, having offered neither
argument nor authority opposing Fuchs' arguments. ISP argues only that this case
involves issues of "first impression" and that this Court's decision in Smith v. Washington

County, 150 Idaho 388 (2010) prohibits an award of attorney fees. Both arguments are
wrong.
The issues involved in this case have been well settled. Before the administrative
complaint was filed, ISP had maintained a long-standing and unequivocal enforcement
policy regarding LC. 23-908(4) and IDAPA 11.05.01.010.03. It did not require a
specified number of "actual sales." ISP's reversal of this policy, enunciating five different
standards during the course of the administrative proceedings, was arbitrary, capricious,
an abuse of discretion, and in violation of the Idaho Constitution, Article III, § 24, and the
rulemaking requirements of the Idaho Administrative Procedures Act, LC. 67-5201 et

seq. ("APA").
Smith held that LC. 12-117, as amended, does not apply to "administrative
judicial proceedings." Smith does not prevent a party from appealing an adverse decision
by an agency head on the issue of attorney fees. Judicial review of an agency decision is
required under the AP A. As Fuchs is not seeking attorney fees and costs for the Petition
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF
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for Judicial Review to the District Court, nor on appeal to this Court, Smith does not
apply.
This Court should reverse the District Court's Decision on Appeal and remand the
matter to the Director for a determination of the amount of attorney fees to be awarded to
Fuchs under LC. 12-117.
II.
ISP HAS WAIVED ON APPEAL ANY ARGUMENT THAT FUCHS WAS NOT
THE "PREVAILING PARTY." ISP HAS WAIVED ANY ARGUMENT THAT
FUCHS DID NOT HAVE A "SUBSTANTIAL RIGHT" TO ATTORNEY FEES.

This Court has held that a party "waives an issue on appeal if either authority or
argument is lacking." Nelson v. Anderson Lumber Co., 140 Idaho 702, 713 (2004 );

Kootenai Medical Center ex rel. Teresa K. v. Idaho Dept. of Health and Welfare, 147
Idaho 872, 880 (2009). Here, ISP does not present argument or cite authority suggesting
that Fuchs was not the "prevailing party." 1 ISP presents no argument or authority to
suggest that Fuchs' right to seek attorney fees is not a "substantial right," as that
requirement applies to Fuchs under LC. 67-5279(4). Consequently, ISP has waived
opposition to Fuchs' arguments on these issues.
The District Court's Decision on Appeal was based only upon these two issues:
"prevailing party"; and, "substantial right" to fees and costs. The District Court held that
Fuchs had not demonstrated that his right to attorney fees was a substantial right, as
required by LC. 67-5279 (4). (Decision on Appeal at 3, R. at 124). 2 The District Court

1

As ISP fails to argue that Fuchs was not the prevailing party, Fuchs shall not re-argue that point here. See
Appellant's Brief at 17-20. However, the administrative proceeding was dismissed and Fuchs retained his
license without sanction.
2
The District Court made this holding, sua sponte, without any such argument having been advanced by
ISP. Attorney fees which are awardable under mandatory fee statutes are substantial rights. Myers v.
Vermass, 114 Idaho 85, 87 (Ct. App. 1987); Griggs v. Nash, 116 Idaho 228,235 (1989);. See, Appellant's
Brief at 11-17. See also, Houston v. Whittier, 147 Idaho 900, 911 (2009).
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held that the Director had not abused his discretion in finding that Fuchs was not the
prevailing party. (Id. at 4, R. at 125). Since the District Court made these rulings, it did
not address whether ISP's actions were without a reasonable basis in fact or law. (Id.). A
minimum, the District Court's Decision on appeal should be reversed, based upon that
ISP has failed to submit authority or argument opposing Fuchs' appeal on these grounds,
"prevailing party" and "substantial right" to fees and costs. "A party waives an issue on
appeal if either authority or argument is lacking, not just if both are lacking." State v.
Zichko, 129 Idaho 259,263 (1996) (emphasis added). This is true, regardless of whether

it was the appellant or respondent who waived the issue. See, Medical Recovery
Services, LLCv. Carnes, 148 Idaho 868,873 (Ct. App. 2010) (respondent failed to cite

authority for argument).
While the District Court did not decide whether ISP acted without a reasonable
basis in fact or law, this Court exercises free review over requests for attorney fees.
Reardon and l11fagic Valley Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. City a/Burley, 140 Idaho 115, 118

(2004). This Court should decide this issue on appeal then remand for determination by
the Director of the amount of attorney fees to be awarded.

III.
THE ISSUES BEFORE THIS COURT ARE WELL-SETTLED AND NOT
MATTERS OF FIRST IMPRESSION
Since IDAPA 11.05.01.010.03 was promulgated in 1993, ISP had enforced the
rule consistently and uniformly. It never required any number of "actual sales" to satisfy
the "actual use" requirement of LC. 23-908 (4) "during" the first six months. Even Lt.
Clements, the most recent ABC Bureau Chief, did not require "actual sales." (Affidavit of
Daniel S. Fuchs, dated October 9, 2009, hereinafter "Fuchs Affidavit"; Exhibit R-DF-6).
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF
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However, ISP changed its policy with this case. It filed this action in October 2008,
without defining, even understanding how many sales it might deem could satisfy the
rule. "Probably more than one drink. It's plural." (Affidavit of Brian Donesley,
hereinafter "Donesley Affidavit" Deposition of Robert Clements, Exhibit R-8, pp. 3536). Cltimately, the Director disagreed with the ABC Bureau Chief, Lt. Clements. He
ruled that IDAPA 11.05.01.010.03 was ambiguous. He ordered that the rule could be
interpreted three different ways. (Director's Final Order dated June 8, 2010 at 10). It is
clear that ISP should not have filed this action without having first promulgating a new or
amended rule, announcing to the public, including Mr. Fuchs, that it had changed its
policy regarding "actual sales." Nor should it have filed this action without first
establishing how many "actual sales" of liquor drinks would be required to satisfy this
new policy. ISP did neither. It acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law. This
Court should award attorney fees and costs to Fuchs pursuant to LC. 12-117.
An essential purpose behind LC. 12-117 is to provide a remedy when a person has
borne financial costs resulting from groundless and arbitrary agency actions:
The purpose of LC. 12-117 is two-fold: First, it serves "as a deterrent to
groundless or arbitrary agency action; and [second, it provides] a remedy
for persons who have borne unfair and unjustified financial burdens
defending against groundless charges or attempting to correct mistakes
agencies never should have made.

Reardon v. City of Burley, 140 Idaho 115, 118 (2004) (quoting Rincover v. State, Dept. of
Fin., Sec. Bureau, 132 Idaho 547, 548-49 (1999) (quoting Bogner v. State Dep't of
Revenue and Taxation, 107 Idaho 854, 859 (1984)).
ISP argues that it is insulated from an award of attorney fees, regardless of the
arbitrariness and unreasonableness of its actions, because, as it contends, this is a "case of
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF
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first impression":
[U]ntil this dispute arose, there had been no interpretation of either Idaho
Code 23-908 (4) or IDAPA I 1.05.01.010.03 which are the code section
and administrative rule at issue.
(Respondent's Brief at 5).
This is ISP's primary argument in opposition to attorney fees. 3 It is wrong for
two reasons. First, ISP should not be entitled to act arbitrarily and capriciously, departing
from longstanding enforcement standards pertaining to its own rules, and then to hide
behind the claim that this "case is one of first impression." Such an administrative "onefree bite" concept would undermine and subsume the LC. 12-117 purpose of preventing
state agencies from taking groundless actions "made without a rational basis, or in
disregard of the facts and circumstances, or without adequate determining principles."

Lane Ranch Partnership, v. City of Sun Valley, 145 Idaho 87, 90 (2007). During the
course of the administrative proceedings, ISP enunciated five different standards of what
constituted the specified number of "actual sales." 4 Failure to offer "clearly articulated

3

ISP argues that Fuchs "argues repeatedly that "Rule 10.03 was ambiguous, hence void." Respondent's
Brief at 5 (emphasis added). Fuchs made this statement twice in his opening brief before the District Court.
(R. at 26, 32). However, in his reply brief, Fuchs clarified this statement: "Respondent is correct that there
is no bright line rule that once a rule is declared ambiguous, it is automatically void. However, it is
impossible to enforce a rule that has had no clear standard but has become a moving target. If a statute or
rule is ambiguous, the rules of statutory construction require that courts look to long-time agency
application of the rule. State v. Hagerman Water Right Owners, 130 Idaho 727, 733 (1997). Courts
construe ambiguities against the drafter. Higginson v Westergard, 100 Idaho 687, 691 (1979). Courts
construe ambiguous statutes and rules to avoid 'unnecessarily harsh consequences.' Id." Appellant Fuchs'
Reply Brief in Support of Petition for Judicial Review at 9, n. 7. (R. at 75-76).
4

The five interpretations are as follows: (]) the original interpretation that the rule was non-mandatory.
(Thompson Affidavit at ,r ,r 4-6) (Affidavit of Denise Rogers dated October 9, 2009 at ,r 4); (2) Lt.
Clements' interpretation: multiple hourly sales, eight (8) hours a day, six (6) days a week. (Robert
Clements Deposition, Donesley Affidavit, Exhibit R-8); (3) the Hearing Officer's interpretation: "actual
sales ofliquor sometime while [the licensee] is in operation for eight hours a day/no fewer than six days a
week." Preliminary Order on Motions for Summary Judgment and Order on Complainant's Renewed
Motion for Protective Order dated December 24, 2009 at 15; (4) the Director's interpretation: "six (6)
sales a week." Director's Final Order at 11; (5) the Director's alternate interpretation which he then
rejected, "one (1) sale a week." Id. at 10.

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF
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standards" prior to the commencement of the action was arbitrary, capricious and abuse
of discretion. See, Ater v. Idaho Bureau of Occupational Licenses, 144 Idaho 281, 285
(2007).
Further, ISP' s reliance solely on the "case of first impression" focuses its failure
to bring argument or authority opposing the underlying bases upon which Fuchs has
demonstrated that ISP acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law. ISP does not argue
that it articulated clear legal standards. It does not argue that it abided by the AP A's
rulemaking procedures. It does not argue that its requirement of "actual sales complies
with Idaho Constitution Article III, § 24. ISP waives opposition to those issues raised by
Fuchs. See, supra, pp. 3-4).
And, this is not a case of first impression. "A case of first impression does not
constitute an area of settled law." Purco Fleet Services, Inc. v Idaho State Dept. of

Finance, 140 Idaho 121 (2004). For many years, past ISP administrators interpreted and
enforced I.C. 23-908(4) and IDAPA 11.05.01.010.03 to not require any number of
"actual sales," or any sales at all, basing such enforcement policy upon public policy
grounds. "Such a requirement would have been unlawful, in violation of public policy."
(Affidavit of Edgar Rankin dated October 9, 2009 at i1 4). 5 Then, in Fuchs', ISP changed
policy, without notice to Fuchs or the public. Suddenly, "actual sales," in some
undefined number, were required, contrary to longstanding agency interpretation and

5

See also, Affidavit of John Gould dated October 9, 2009: "such a requirement would be nonsensical,
since, as a matter of common sense, a licensee cannot control how many people come into a licensed
premise and buy drinks over any period of time." (Id. at ,T 5); Affidavit of Major Thomas Thompson: "A
new licensee would also satisfy the requirements ofl.C. 23-908 (4), ifhe or she secured a qualified premise
and made liquor available at that premise, without making sales." (Affidavit of Thomas Thompson dated
October 9, 2009 at ,T 5).

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF
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enforcement of the statute and the rule. Rather, the Director declared in his Final Order a
new interpretation of Rule 11.05.01.010.03, stating that new licensees must make "one
(1) sale per hour sometime during every day that the establishment is open." Director's
Final Order at 1 1. This was simply another new rule. The Director acknowledged that he
was making new policy when he stated that prior administrators and current ABC
officials had gotten it wrong before. Id. at 17.
It is because the Director's current administrators misapplied the rule that Fuchs

has been required to bear the financial burden of correcting government mistakes that
"never should have been made." Reardon and Magic Valley Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. City
of Burley, 140 Idaho 115, 118 (2004) (citations omitted). The Director attempts to

correct errors by announcing, yet again, a new rule. Then he applied that new rule to
Fuchs retroactively. The Director states in his order that Fuchs' arguments, that his
current administrators' interpretation is "misdirected," fail, because the Director
retroactively had cured their misinterpretation by coming up with a new, "rational"
interpretation in his Final Order. Director's Final Order at 16-17.
The Director's contrivance to correct the errors made by the ABC Bureau was a
new rule. It is clearly established law that a state agency must promulgate a new or
amended rule when it decides to change policies that affect the public. In 1991, Deputy
Attorney General Michael Gilmore explained to the special legislative council committee
formed to modernize the Idaho AP A that a purpose behind the rulemaking provisions was
to stop agencies from engaging in informal rulemaking:
Mr. Michael Gilmore, Attorney General's Task Force, stated the purpose
of this Act is to stop agencies from using informal internal guidance
documents and to give supervising attorneys a clear statement from the
legislature that this has to stop. He said the requirement in this Act is that
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF
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if it's not written and promulgated as a rule, it can't be used.
st

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES ACT OF 1992, 51 Legislature, Committee
Minutes, p. 392 (October 29, 1991) (Attached Appendix) (emphasis added).
This Court has since reviewed attempts by state agencies to avoid rulemaking. In

Asarco v. State, 138 Idaho 719, 725 (2003), this Court rejected the State Division of
Environmental Quality's attempt to change its policies without following formal
rulemaking requirements:
It is undisputed that DEQ did not comply with formal rulemaking
requirements. Rather than arguing that it substantially complied with the
rulemaking requirements, DEQ argued it did not have to do so. Thus, the
district court correctly held the TMDL is void for failure to comply with
state administrative law.

Asarco, 138 Idaho at 725.
This is settled law. ISP must promulgate a new or amended rule to change policies
affecting the public.
And, it is important that this case involves the interpretation of a rule, rather than
a statute. In Rincover v. State Dept of Finance, 132 Idaho 54 7 ( 1999), this Court declined
to award fees against the State under LC. 12-117, because no court had interpreted the
statute at issue. "At the time, the specific provisions of LC. 30-1413, which were relied
upon by the Department, had not been construed by the courts." Rincover, 132 Idaho at
550. 6 Ours is not a case about a statute, a law written by the legislature, but by a rule
written by the agency itself. A rule is not a statute. See, Meade v. Arnell, 117 Idaho 660,

6

See also, State Dept. of Finance v. Resource Service Corp., Inc., 134 Idaho 282 (2000) (interpretation of
LC. 30-1413); Purco Fleet Services, Inc v. Idaho State Dept. ofFinance, 140 Idaho 121 (2004)
(interpretation of LC. 26-2223(2)). Appellant Fuchs' attorneys have found no cases where the appellate
court denied fees to a petitioner on the basis that it was a case of first impression where the agency was
enforcing its own rule that it determined to be ambiguous.

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF
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664 (1990) ("while these rules and regulations may be given the 'force and effect of law,'
they do not rise to the level of statutory law").
The Director acknowledged this distinction, explaining in his Final Order that he
would consider future rulemaking to clarify the rule:

Because of the ambiguity ofIDAPA 11.05.01.010.03, it would be
appropriate for further clarification of this rule. To that end, the Director
will be reviewing the matter for possible rulemaking in the near future.
Director's Final Order at 11, n. 4. (Emphasis added.)
As the Director had the authority and obligation to administer his agency's rules, this
case is distinguishable from Rincover and Purco Fleet Services, Inc., v. Idaho State Dept.

ofFinance, 140 Idaho 121 (2004) (cited in Respondent's Brief at 5). 7
ISP's prior administrators long ago had established the ruanner in which ISP
would enforce LC. 23-908 (4) and IDAPA 11.05.01.010.03. ISP admits that it had
changed policy when it began requiring some conjectural number of "actual sales."
(Respondent's Brief in Opposition to Petition for Judicial Review filed before the District
Court at 5, R. at 58). The Director acknowledged he was changing policy, stating that
prior administrators had applied it incorrectly. Director's Final Order at 17.
ISP was required, under LC. 67-5220 through LC. 67-5231, to promulgate a new
or amended rule legally changing its long-established policy, before it filed this
administrative action. See, Asarco v. State, 138 Idaho 719, 725 (2003) (state's failure to
comply with state administrative law rendered informal action void as it should have

7

The Director's rulemaking authority is provided in I.C. 23-932, which provides in relevant part: "[f]or the
purpose of the administration of this act the director shall make, promulgate and publish such rules and
regulations as the said director may deem necessary for carrying out the provisions of this act and for the
orderly and efficient administration hereof, and except as may be limited or prohibited by law and the
provisions of this act, such rules and regulations so made and promulgated shall have the force of statute."
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been done by rulemaking). 8 It did not do so. Fuchs should not bear the financial burden
of correcting ISP mistakes that never should have been made by the agency.
As ISP's failure to follow settled administrative law was without a reasonable
basis in fact or law, this Court should reverse the District Court and award attorney fees
to Fuchs pursuant to LC. 12-117.
IV.

PARTIES MAY SEEK ATTORNEY FEES IN ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEEDINGS WHERE THE NON-PREVAILING PARTY ACTED WITHOUT
A REASONABLE BASIS IN FACT OR LAW. PARTIES ARE ENTITLED TO
APPEAL AGENCY DECISIONS ON ATTORNEY FEES

ISP argues that Fuchs may not seek costs and attorney fees under LC. 12-117,
based upon this Court's ruling in Smith v. Washington County, 150 Idaho 388 (2010). In
Smith, this Court ruled that parties may only seek attorney fees in "administrative
proceedings," but not in "administrative judicial proceedings." Smith, 150 Idaho at 392.
ISP argues that Smith means that parties cannot appeal adverse agency decisions on
requests for attorney fees. Such an argument would render meaningless LC. 12-117.
Neither parties to "administrative proceedings" nor "administrative judicial proceedings"
would be entitled to attorney fees. This is contrary to what this Court held in Smith. 150
Idaho at 392. 9
Further, such a result would be contrary to the Idaho AP A, which provides
aggrieved parties the right to judicial review of agency decisions. LC. 67-5270, 5279. In

8

See, Appellant's Brief at 27-28.
In four cases since Smith was issued, this Court declined to award attorney fees based upon Smith's
holding that I.C. 12-117, as amended, did not provide authority for fees incurred in district court on appeal
from an agency decision. Kimbrough v. Idaho Bd. of Tax Appeals, 150 Idaho 417 (2011 ); Vickers v. Lowe,
150 Idaho 439(2011); St. Luke's Magic Valley Regional Medical Center, Ltd. v. Board of County Com'rs of
Gooding County, l 50 Idaho 484 (2011 ); In re City of Shelley, 151 Idaho 289 (2011 ). None of these cases
involved requests for fees incurred before the agency.
9
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State ex rel. Richardson v. Pierandozzi 117 Idaho 1 (1989), a liquor license revocation

case, this Court held that it is the right to judicial review that cures any unconstitutional
bias of an administrative decision-maker. "The potential for bias is cured by the fact that
the parties have the right to judicial appeal of any administrative decision manifesting an
abuse of discretion, arbitrary and capricious disposition, or findings which are clearly
erroneous in light of the evidence presented at the hearing. Id. at 4. See also, Sta[[ of the
Idaho Real Estate Commission v. Nordling, 135 Idaho 630, 636 (2001). This is a due

process requirement. Review is essential.
Consistent with Smith, Fuchs is not seeking an award of costs and attorney fees
incurred on his Petition for Judicial Review to the District Court.

° Fuchs is not

1

requesting attorney fees on his appeal to this Court under LC. 12-117 and I.A.R. 41.
However, Fuchs is appealing the District Court's decision affirming the Director's Final
Order denying to Appellant Fuchs costs and attorney fees in the administrative
proceeding filed before the agency by ISP on October 23, 2008. Fuchs is entitled to
request attorney fees. He was a prevailing party. 11 The agency acted without a
reasonable basis in fact or law. 12 Fuchs' appeal is properly before this Court. This Court

°

1

Fuchs did request such fees in his initial Notice of Appeal/Petition for Judicial Review filed in the
District Court on June 22, 2010. (R. at 11 ). That petition was filed before Smith was issued by this Court on
December 15, 2010.
11

Fuchs prevailed below. The Director dismissed the action, refusing to revoke Fuchs' license or to
sanction him. Further, the Director rejected the ABC's interpretation of the rule that multiple drinks per
hour were required. The Director declared ID APA 11.05.01.0 l 0.03 ambiguous and then announced a new
rule. Director's Final Order at 10-11. Because Fuchs obtained all relief he requested, he prevailed. Daisy
Manufacturing Co. v. Paintball Sports, Inc. 134 Idaho 259 (Ct. App. 2000). See, Appellant's Brief at l 7-20.
12

ISP acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law. It acted arbitrarily and capriciously, failing to
articulate clear standards. Ater v. Idaho Bureau of Occupational Licenses, 144 Idaho 281 (2007). It acted
arbitrarily and capriciously, failing to follow its own laws and rules. County Residents Against Pollution
From Septic Sludge (CRAPSS) v. Bonner County, 138 Idaho 585). It failed to follow required rulemaking
procedures. Asarco v. State, 138 Idaho 719 (2003 ). It violated the Idaho Constitution. Reardon and Magic
Valley Sand & Gravel v. City ofBurley, 140 Idaho 115 (2004). See, Appellant's Brief at 20-29.
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should reject ISP's suggestion that parties cannot appeal a decision by an administrative
officer denying an award of attorney fees and costs.
V.
CONCLUSION

Fuchs has met the requirements of LC. 12-117. Fuchs prevailed. ISP acted
without a reasonable basis in fact or law. This case has not presented issues of first
impression to this Court. And, the APA requires that parties be permitted judicial review
of agency decision, and, thus, Smith v. Washington County, 150 Idaho 388 (2010) does
not apply.
This Court should reverse the District Court's Decision on Appeal and remand the
matter to the Director for a determination of the attorney fees and costs to be awarded to
Fuchs. Fuchs requests costs on appeal.
DATED this 3 day ofNovember, 2011.
R~ctfull.y s~bmitted

(~---'~"' Oo "" ,CL"
Brian Donesley
Attorney for Petitioner-Appellant,
Daniel S. Fuchs
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APPENDIX

LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
Fint Regular Session - 1991

F'"ifty-first Vgisbtnre

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
HOUSE CONCURRENT RESOLUTION NO. 15
BY JUDICIARY, RULES AND ADMINISTRATION COMMITTEE
1
2
3

A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION
AUTHORIZING AND DIRECTING THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL TO APPOINT A COMMITTEE
UNDERTAKE AND COMPLETE A STUDY OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES ACT.

4

Be It Resolved by the Legislature of the State of Idaho:

5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35

TO

WHEREAS, the Administrative Procedures Act contained in Chapter 52, Title
67, Idaho Code, was first enacted in 1965; and
WHEREAS, the Administrative Procedures Act was amended by the passage of
House Bill No. 529 in 1990 which related to legislative oversight of adminis~
trative rules and was interpreted in 1990 by the Idaho Supreme Court in the
case of Mead v. Arnell; and
WHEREAS, the Mead v. Arnell case upheld the Legislature's authority to
reject rules and regulations promulgated by the executive -branch of government; and
WHEREAS, the problem of notice for proposed rules under the Administrative Procedures Act is one that both state agencies and persons or entities
regulated by rules and regulations seem to struggle with; and
WHEREAS, the world, Idaho and state government have changed greatly since
1965 and an examination of the Administrative Procedures Act is in order to
modernize it, make it more efficient and have it better serve the needs of the
people of the state as well as agencies of state government.
NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED by the members of the First Regular Session
of the Fifty-first Idaho Legislature, the House of Representatives and the
Senate concurring therein, that the Legislative Council is authorized and
directed to appoint a twelve person committee, with six members from the Senate and six members from the House of Representatives, to undertake and complete a study of the Administrative Procedures Act with emphasis given to legislative oversight of administrative rules and the general procedure of how
rules get promulgated and notice is given to and received by the public. In
conducting this study, the Committee shall consult with the directors or
administrative heads of state agencies and institutions, and the private, publie entities and persons who are impacted by or regulated by administrative
rules and the general provisions of the Administrative Procedures Act.
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that the Committee shall report its findings, recommendations and proposed legislation, if any, to the Second Regular Session
of the Fifty-first Idaho Legislature.
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Legislative Council
Committee on Administrative Procedures
senate Caucus Room
Statehouse, Boise, Idaho
October 29, 1991
MINUTES

The meeting was called to order at 9 a. m. by Cochairrnan
Senator Vance.
Other members in attendance were Cochairman
Representative Simpson, Senators Donesley, Hawkins, Kerrick,
McLaughlin, and Wetherell, and Representatives Pete Black, Duncan,
and Loveland.
Representative Adams was absent and excused.
Representative Infanger was absent.
Staff in attendance were
Schlechte and wood.
Others in attendance were Representative Loertscher; Carl
Olsson and Bob Fry, State Tax Commission; Dale Goble, Mike Gilmore,
Jack McMahon, Korey Lowder, and Michael DeAngelo, Attorney
General's Task Force; Paul Pusey, Boise; Jon Carter, Governor's
Office; Woody Richards, Moffatt, Thomas, Barrett, Rock, and Fields;
Reagan Davis and Dick Rush, Idaho Association of Commerce and
Industry; and Bob C. Hall, Idaho Newspaper Association.
Mr. Jack McMahon, Deputy Attorney General, Attorney General's
Office, stated that Attorney General Larry EchoHawk made it a
priority of his office to review the Administrative Procedures Act
(APA) for state agencies.
He said through the courtesy of the
cochairmen of this committee, the decision was made to allow the
Attorney General's Task Force to go forward and draft a document
covering all the APA excepting the legislative oversight
provisions.
Mr. McMahon stated the Task Force started meeting in April and
includes members representing the state agencies, the private
sector, and local government, and five legislators representing
both parties in the House and Senate. He said the Task Force was
divided into three groups:
rulemaking, contested cases, and
publication of rules.
He said these committees met periodically
throughout the summer, and by late summer had put together a first
draft which has been mailed to attorneys and other interested
parties throughout the state for their review and comment.
Mr. McMahon said the comments received have been integrated
into the attorney general's draft document. The committee has also
met with the Idaho Association of Commerce and Industry's legal
advisory team, private sector attorneys, 20 deputy attorneys
general, and key contacts in the media inasmuch as one of the
provisions in the draft is of serious concern to the media.
He
said the draft is now in two different forms, one of which is in
legislative format drafted by Legislative Council.
The other,
drafted by Professor Dale Goble, University of Idaho College of
Law, varies slightly and contains comments after each section.
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Professor Goble stated that there is a perception that
agencies act on the basis of secret law.
He said the draft·
attempts to make agency actions and proceedings more open to the
public. The creation of the Idaho Administrative Bulletin and the
Idaho Administrative Code in the draft are steps in that direction.
He continued that the public notice requirements in rulemaking have
been expanded and the time limits for interim legislative review
have been extended to increase the public participation.
Professor Goble said the second thing they tried to do is
"regularize• what agencies are doing.
They tried to look at the
kinds of things that agencies currently are doing, figure out how
many different kinds of things there were, and then specify the
procedures for those kinds of things. He said this is particularly
true in contested cases.
Professor Goble said the third thing they tried to do is to
keep it simple and informal. He said a number of people commenting
on the initial draft said, "Don't make it very complicated." He
said people indicated they want it so that individuals can go to
an agency to try and solve their problems without having to involve
an attorney.
Professor Goble said all the way through they have
attempted to do that.
For example, he said they have encouraged
agencies to engage in negotiated rulemaking.
They have attempted
to give flexibility so that agencies can formally negotiate
contested case problems.
Professor Goble said the APA is divided into five general
sections, four of which were a part of the model APA, and the
fifth, Legislative Review, from current law.
1.

General Provisions

Professor Goble said the first section deals with a number of
general provisions that are applicable throughout the Act. He said
in reviewing definitions, three of those definitions tie into one
another and are of particular importance.
The first is the
definition of agency action.
Most of the judicial review
provisions in the Act are tied into the idea that agency action is
subject to judicial review; therefore, the definition of agency
action tends to be a trigger for judicial review.
Professor Goble said the second and third definitions are
"order" and 11 rule. 11 He said the two primary things that agencies
do are to either issue orders following a contested case, or adopt
a rule following a rulemaking.
Professor Goble said the second major thing contained in
general provisions is the creation of the office of Administrative
Rules Coordinator. The Rules Coordinator will be responsible for
the publication of two documents:
the Idaho Administrative
Bulletin to be published biweekly and conta·in notices of propos·ed

2
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rulemaking; and the Idaho Administrative Code to be published
annually and contain all final rules promulgated by an agency. The
bulletin will be widely distributed throughout the state and will
be available in libraries around the state.
It will also be
available in subscription form.
2.

Rulemaking

Professor Goble said there are relatively few changes in the
rulemaking provisions from the current statute. He said one of the
changes is found is Section 67-5220 where an additional step is
added at the beginning of the process to have agencies notify the
public of their intent to promulgate a rule, the idea being that
the earlier the public is given notice, the better.
Professor
Goble said the notice of intent is the voluntary step designed to
get notice out to the public and to encourage agency decision
making to be as open as possible.
Professor Goble said Sections 67-5221 through 67-5224 set out
four mandatory procedures that an agency is required to go through
to promulgate rules.
The agency has to publish a notice in the
bulletin that contains a wide range of information including the
text of the proposed rule. Concurrent with the publication in the
bulletin, notification goes to the legislature. The legislative
subcommittees have an opportunity to hold a hearing on the rule if
they choose to do so. In the third step, the public also has an
opportunity to make comment on the proposed rule, including the
opportunity to require some kind of an oral presentation.
The
final step in the process is that the agency is required to publish
a statement including the reasons for and an explanation of the
rule in conjunction with publishing the final rule in the bulletin.
Professor Goble said in order to facilitate judicial review
of the process, Section 67-5225 requires the agency to put together
a record in conjunction with the rulemaking process. He said the
current statute provides for emergency rules. Section 67-5226 of
this proposal somewhat expands the kinds of rules that can be
promulgated by authorizing the agencies to promulgate temporary
rules in certain circumstances. If an agency proposes to change
a rule to comply with changes in federal law, then it can do so
through a temporary rule while it promulgates a final rule. If the
agency is conferring a benefit, then it can do so through an
emergency rule followed by a final rule. He said it was felt that
in both of those situations we wouldn't run the risk of cutting off
people's rights.
Professor Goble said one safeguard with a
temporary rule is that it only lasts for a maximum of 27 weeks.
Professor Goble stated that in order to determine when
government actions are going to happen, all the way through the APA
they attempted to change time frames over to multiples of seven
days. He said longer numbers are specified in terms of weeks; the
shorter numbers are specified in multiples of seven days.
3
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3.

Contested Cases

Professor Goble stated that contested cases are those
situations in which the agency action affects an individual's
rights or responsibilities. As a result, these provisions are the
most intricate, interrelated, and complex provisions of the Act.
He said they attempted to find common problems that confront
agencies in contested cases, and essentially found that there are
five different models in things that agencies did. He said they
then attempted to draft law that captured those five things. One
of the major distinctions between the five things is whether or not
the agency head makes the initial decision. He said in a couple
of situations the agency head will make the initial decision. In
the other three situations, somebody other than the agency head,
generally a hearing officer, will make the first decision in the
agency. He said there is then the possibility in the latter three
of some kind of internal appeals process and that tends to be what
separates out the five different groups.
Representative Duncan stated that he was somewhat concerned
with the wording in 67-5240 as far as making the transition from
the "rulemaking" process to the "contested cases" process; i.e.,
11
a contested case is governed by the provisions of this chapter. 11
The chapter will be Chapter 52 -- so would that mean that contested
cases would be governed by some of the things in prior sections
dealing with rulemaking?
He asked how we would stop that
conclusion from happening?
Professor Goble responded that it is covered by this chapter
in the sense that the definition provisions in the first part of
the Act apply here, and the judicial review provisions in the last
part of the Act apply here as well. He said he thought it would
be possible to go through and specify the various sections.
Representative Duncan said he wondered if there would be a
conflict with "one of those guys with a black robe," who would
somehow use one of the rulemaking proceedings that doesn't
specifically start out by saying "this only applies to rulemaking,"
and come up here with some sort of ambiguity or contradiction
between contested cases.
Mr. McMahon said the document should be worded so carefully
that that will never happen. He said it's a challenge we should
accept.
He said agency actions are either rules or orders,
rulemakings or contested cases, and the vocabulary has been done
so carefully that rulemaking provisions, even though they are part
of this chapter too, should never be capable of confusion in a
contested case arena. Mr. McMahon said we should make perfectly
sure of that.
Professor Goble said if an agency tries to do something to a
particular person or a small, particularly identified group of
4
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individuals, by definition that's an order, and by definition you
can only do an order through a contested case. He said we've tried
to draw the line between general legislative rulemaking and
individual contested case order.
Senator Donesley questioned when does the specificity break
down and an order become a rule? Professor Goble responded that
any time you try to draw a line there's a gray area where the two
meet.
He said orders tend to be directed toward events that
occurred in the past, whereas a rule tends to look to the future.
In response to a question by Senator Donesley, Professor Goble said
under both the rulemaking and the contested case provisions,
there's the opportunity to seek declaratory judgment.
Mr. McMahon said that sometimes agencies get in the middle of
a case and they say, "Gee, this is a good policy for this person;
we want this policy to start governing everything we do for all
the other people that we're going to deal with." He said that in
Section 67-5250, Indexing of Precedential Agency Orders, we've
said, "You can't do that unless you either make it into a rule, or
index that opinion and keep it available."
Everyone would then
know that from then on that policy was established and the agency
was going to ·rely on it from now on.
Senator Donesley said from a practical matter in some agencies
there are informal memos, guidelines, opinions, and enforcement
guidelines -- will these be permissible under these rules? Are
they prohibited, such that they have no effect unless promulgated
lawfully, or have we addressed that issue at all?
Professor Goble said we didn't address that issue specifically
and it is probably impossible to get away from having such
documents. But, if we try to say that we have to publish them all,
maybe it will require a phone call to determine the agency policy.
He said when they were at IACI they heard similar concerns that
agencies have such internal guidance documents. Nobody could find
out what they were, and they would really like to see something in
there about having internal guidance documents, much like the
precedential orders.
Mr. Michael DeAngelo, Attorney General's Task Force, stated
that according to 67-5249, these things are required to be placed
in the record, so they must be available as part of the contested
case record. When balancing that with 67-5250, the intent is that
we can't use anything as precedent or binding unless it's indexed
and available for public inspection.
Professor Goble said the other difference is that if an agency
goes through the process of promulgating a policy as a regulation,
then the regulation itself has the force and effect of law. The
agency then doesn't have to prove that it's valid in subsequent
contested cases.
He said that's where one starts from, just as
5

October - 392

though it were statute.
But, if there is an internal guidance
document that's never promulgated, then every time the agency wants
to use that, it has to establish that the policy itself corresponds
to the statute. He said if the agency promulgates a rule, it gains
vis-a-vis judicial review. If it chooses not to, then the internal
guidance document does not have the force and effect of law.
Mr. Mike Gilmore, Attorney General's Task Force, stated the
purpose of this Act is to stop agencies from using informal
internal guidance documents and to give supervising attorneys a
clear statement from the legislature that this has to stop.
He
said the requirement in this Act is that if it's not written and
promulgated as a rule, it can't be used.

Professor Goble said there are five models of contested cases.
He said the first kind of thing that agencies do is issue a notice
of violation or a complaint.
The most common occurrence when a
notice of violation is issued is that the person who receives it
will say, "Yeah, you caught me, here's the penalty, u and that will
be the end of it. Notices of violation are treated as one form of
informal disposition of a contested case. He said if the person
who receives the notice of violation objects to the notice, they
can trigger a contested case. They have the authority to go in and
request a full hearing before the agency on the matter. Professor
Goble said there doesn't have to be a contested case to issue a
notice of violation. The inspector can go out and issue the notice
of violation.
If the person does not contest the notice of
violation, he can pay the penalty and there is no need to go
through a full procedure, but we give the option to the person who
receives the notice of violation to initiate the process. That's
the first model.
Professor Goble said the second and third models are
situations in which the hearing is held by a hearing officer. The
difference between the two is whether or not the order becomes
final without the head of the agency having done anything. He said
one recurrent factual pattern is that the hearing officer hears
the case and prepares a recommended decision.
That recommended
decision does not become final until it goes to the board and a
decision is made.
Professor Goble said the other similar model is where a
hearing officer hears the case and renders a preliminary order.
That preliminary order then becomes final unless one of the two
parties to the hearing requests a hearing before the agency head.
Therefore, when you have a recommended order, the order doesn't
become final until the agency head acts. With a preliminary order,
it becomes final unless there is a request for administrative
review of the matter. Professor Goble said then there are final
orders, situations where the agency head will actually do the
hearing and will make the decision.
6
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Professor Goble said these four types of orders follow the
same procedures as set out in Section 67-5242. There are no real
significant changes in this section; it is essentially the way it
is done now.
Professor Goble said the fifth type of order, the
emergency order, has a separate procedure and is designed for a
small number of situations in which there is a pressing threat to
public health or safety. He said in such situations an expedited
procedure is available for issuing an emergency order.
Professor Goble said the remaining provisions in the contested
case materials are essentially housekeeping and there are no
significant changes in there. One change that goes along with the
idea of reducing the range of secret law has to do with agencies
taking official notice, which is found at 67-5251. If an agency
proposes to take official notice, all parties must be notified to
allow them a reasonable opportunity to contest and rebut the facts.
The agency will not be allowed to "shove documents• at the opposing
side; they'll have to have a staff person bring the document with
them and be available to testify as to the document.
4.

Judicial Review of Agency Action

Professor Goble said the only significant change in the
judicial review provisions was to make them applicable to
rulemaking as well as to contested cases. In the current statute,
the judicial review provisions apply only to contested cases. He
said reviewing courts, as a result, have scrambled around •pulling
bits and pieces from here and there trying to come up with a way
of reviewing rulemakings.
11

Professor Goble said the other thing they did was to take one
very, very long section and divide it up into separate steps, and
give each of the separate steps a title. He said it now appears
that there's a whole bunch of sections where there was only one
section before; but essentialiy, the one big section was just
divided into smaller sections.
Senator Donesley stated that internal personnel policies are
required by statute and by rule of the Personnel Commission. He
said they do affect private rights. Following discussion regarding
whether or not internal personnel policies of agencies should be
made part of the APA, Senator Donesley agreed that they should not
be because they would only clutter up the Administrative Code.
However, Senator Donesley said that he was concerned about the
wording contained in the definition of "rule" in Section
67-5201(16)(i) where it states 11 • • • not affecting private rights
or procedures available to the public."
In order to make the
language very clear, Senator Donesley requested that it be changed
to"··· not affecting private rights of the public or procedures
available to the public."

7
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In response to a request by Representative Simpson, Professor
Goble reviewed the proposed establishment of an office of
administrative rules coordinator. He said the coordinator will be
responsible for publishing the Administrative Bulletin biweekly
and the Administrative Code annually. These publications are to
be widely distributed throughout the state.
The following
documents shall be published in the Administrative Bulletin:
1.

All proclamations and executive orders of the governor,
except those that have no general applicability or are
effective only against state agencies or persons in their
capacity as officers, agents, or employees thereof.

2.

Agency notices of intent to promulgate rules, notices of
proposed rules, and the text of all proposed and final
rules together with any explanatory material supplied by
the agency.

3.

All documents required by law to be published in the
bulletin.

4.

Any legislative documents affecting a final agency rule.

Professor Goble said the focus is primarily on the publication
of documents related to the promulgation process itself. He said
there are essentially three steps in that publication process. The
first one is a voluntary one (Section 67-5220).
If the agency
chooses it may publish a notice of an intent to promulgate a rule.
Professor Goble said the first mandatory step in the process is set
out in 67-5221, Public Notice of Proposed Rulemaking. The agency
is required to publish a notice in the bulletin which sets out
eight items that are required to be published:
1.

The specific statutory authority for the rulemaking.

2.

A statement in nontechnical language of the substance of
the proposed rule.

3.

A concise nontechnical explanation of the purpose of the
proposed rule.

4.

The text of the proposed rule prepared in legislative
format.

5.

The location, date, and time of any public hearings the
agency intends to hold on the proposed rule.

6.

The manner in which persons shall make written comments
on the proposed rule, including the name and address of
a person in the agency to whom comments on the proposal
shall be sent.
8
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7.

The manner in which persons may request an opportunity
for an oral presentation as provided in Section 67-5222,
Idaho Code.

8.

The deadline for public comments on the proposed rule.

Professor Goble said the initial publication contains two
types of information: one, information about the rule itselfi and
two, information about how to become involved in commenting on the
rule. The rule then goes out for public comment. The agency is
required to give at least 21 days for public comment. Professor
Goble said then there is the public participation period which is
concurrent with the interim legislative review period.
Mr. McMahon said under the current law oftentimes the
legislative review committees end their review proceedings long
before the comment period has expired and the agency is still
receiving comment.
The new proposal makes sure the legislature
can always hold a hearing after all the public comment has been
received rather than when it's still coming in.
Professor Goble said the final step is publication of the
final rule (67-5224).
Basically what is required here is a
statement of the reasons and justifications for adopting the rule,
plus a statement of any change that was made between the proposed
text and the final text.
Professor Goble said on an annual basis all the rules that
have been published in final form in the bulletin will be compiled
into a codification called the Administrative Code.
In response
to a question by Representative Simpson, Professor Goble said it
will also be available through electronic means and will be
available to those who want to subscribe to it.
Mr. McMahon stated that when the office of administrative
rules coordinator is created, it will be effective July 1992. The
Act itself would not take effect until July 1993, so for a year
there will be start up costs necessary for this office before it
can start billing the agencies-for doing the work inasmuch as it
won I t be doing the work; it will be creating a data base and
getting all the existing agency regulations onto the computer.
After July 1993, this office will be self-supporting.
Mr. McMahon said this position was put in the office of the
Governor.
He said there is nothing sacred in this decision and
that it was a 0 flip of the coin° sort of thing because it could
just as well be placed in the Secretary of State's office, the
State Law Library, or in the Audi tor I s off ice. He said some states
place it in the Attorney General's office.
Senator Hawkins stated that he would like to pursue the public
notice aspect in the proposed draft.
He said many of his
9
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constituents ask him, "Why didn't I have notice of this rule?" He
said by publishing proposed rules in only one place, the
Administrative Bulletin, we are actually going to constrict the
public notice rather than expand it. He said he doesn't think that
the average citizen of the state is going to be aware or be
involved in receiving, reviewing, and understanding the bulletin
all the time. He said even though public notice in the newspapers
seems to be inadequate, it does seem to be better, broader, and
more effective than the bulletin.
Professor Goble said there has been absolute unanimity among
everyone that he has talked to that the goal is the best notice
possible at a reasonable cost. He said everyone he has talked to
feels that the best way to hide something is to put it in the legal
section in the back of a newspaper. He said if there is a place
where they are regularly available, and if they are available in
every public library in the state, he feels this is a step ahead.
Mr. Korey Lowder, Department of Health and Welfare, said he
is responsible for all the notices of rulemaking in that
department, and in his five years of experience, he has found that
the majority of people that take notice of a rulemaking get that
notice from a direct mailing from the department; they don't get
it from the newspaper.
He said the department uses a direct
mailing because it realizes that the newspaper publication doesn't
work inasmuch as no one reads them.
In response to a question by Senator McLaughlin, Mr. Lowder
said under the current system, the state is probably spending 25%
more than it should be spending on publications and mailings.
He
said now they are sending out rules, they are sending out legal
notices, and it is "shooting hit and miss."
He said the office
of rules coordinator will allow the agencies to channel their funds
into one constructive means and people will have one place to go
for information on rules and regulations.
Senator McLaughlin asked if there was going to be a charge to
the private people that wish to have access to the bulletin? Mr.
Lowder said if they read the bulletin in the public library it will
be free; if not, there will be a charge. Senator McLaughlin said
that causes her concern because not every town in Idaho has a
public library. She said some people might need to have access to
this information, but they might not have the resources by which
to obtain it.
In response to a question by Senator McLaughlin, Mr. Lowder
said he feels the bulletin will allow more access to the rules and
will inform more people than the current process.
He also
responded that sometimes they notify clients of a possible rule
change and sometimes they don't. Mr. DeAngelo said if there is a
change in level of benefits to Health and Welfare clients, there
is a notification process, but this is not a part of rulemaking
10
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changes. Mr. DeAngelo stated that he doesn't feel there is any
kind of system that is going to guarantee that everyone that needs
and wants to know about a particular issue is going to get that
notice.
Senator Hawkins stated that he feels the notice provision in
the draft proposal is inadequate. He said he does not perceive a
large percentage of his constituency being aware and informed of
a bulletin and being able to follow it, as compared to what there
is now.
He said he has had a lot of constituents read a legal
notice in a newspaper and they didn't know if it affected them or
not, but at least they knew something was happening and took the
initiative then to make a phone call and find out what was
happening.
Representative Simpson said in Section 67-5205 he would like
to add a provision that one copy of the bulletin be distributed to
each city hall in addition to one copy being distributed to each
county clerk.
He would also like to add a provision for an 800
number in the office of the administrative rules coordinator. He
said he feels that once people realize that there is a biweekly
publication that tells them everything they want to know about any
proposed rule or regulation, there will be a much bigger benefit
to the public than there is in a legal notice in a newspaper.
Representative Simpson suggested that a notice be placed in
the newspaper that (a) states that a rule is coming out; and (b)
contains a glossary which indicates which rules are being proposed.
He said this way someone could see that there were rule changes
affecting a particular area. Senator Donesley said this is a good
idea and he would support this idea as it would provide an added
"safety net" for the public.
Senator Hawkins said be believes public notice of a rule
change, even though it presently isn't adequate, needs to be a part
of the promulgation process. He said he really believes that if
we are going to have public involvement in developing rules, we are
going to have to provide better notice than what we're providing
now.
He said individual people won't have a clue as to what's
happening to them with regard to regulations until it's too late.
The committee recessed for lunch at 12:10 p.m. and reconvened
at 1:30 p.m.
Senator Donesley expressed concern about the language in
section 67-5242(1)(c) and said he would like to see it changed so
that it's clear that there must be notice as to facts and generally
as to applicable law, rather than the existing language alone which
requires that a notice must include a statement of the matters
asserted or the issues involved• inasmuch as he is not clear what
that language means.
He said the reason for this suggestion is
that it's quite simple to give people notice of what it is that's
being alleged in a contested case.
0
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Mr. McMahon said the policy choice was made to try to strip
this document down and leave in just the bare essentials with the
intention of following it up with a set of model ruJ.es for all of
the agencies to follow. The model rules support this document and
fill in all the details. He said every agency will have to adopt
model rules unless they adopt something that's better, something
that is more thorough and more protective. (Section 67-5206(5).
Representative Duncan asked about the wording in 67-5240 where
it seems like the Public Utilities Commission is exempted out of
providing rules dealing with contested cases. Professor Goble said
the PUC is taken out of 67-5240 for a couple of reasons: He said
what they do formally fits within the definition of a contested
case, but at the same time it's forward looking which makes it sort
of like a rulemaking; therefore, the normal contested case
proceeding doesn't fit a lot of their processes and procedures very
well. Mr. McMahon said the PUC has a very thorough and elaborate
set of rules that are even thicker than this draft and they are
broken down by type of proceeding.
Mr. McMahon said it was the intent of the Task Force that the
Industrial Commission be included- in Section 67-5240, along with
the Public Utilities Commission, and requested that it be added to
that section.
He said the point was made that the Industrial
Commission has a specific exemption in their statute for their
judicial rulemaking which really is its contested case process, so
they have an entire set of rules that govern how they do contested
cases.
Mr. Schlechte said both the PUC and the Industrial
Commission have direct appeal to the Supreme Court, so they need
to be treated somewhat differently.
Senator Vance stated that at this time the committee will
accept public testimony pertaining to the proposed document.
Senator Michael D. Crapo, Idaho Falls, said that he has some
very strong reservations about the proposed bill that has been
presented to the committee. He said his main concern evolves from
a concern that he has that the citizens of this state, and most
other states, feel removed from the political process. A part of
this is caused by the fact that some of the agencies are, to a
certain extent, becoming those kinds of ·nameless, faceless
bureaucracies that we associate with Washington, D.C.
Senator Crapo said there is a problem in Idaho. He said the
political system has grown beyond the control of the average
citizen in a number of areas, and one of those areas is the
Administrative Procedures Act and the interplay of citizens with
state agencies.
He said nine out of ten of the constituent
contacts he has concern a problem that a citizen is having with an
executive agency. He said this makes sense because that is where
government really meets the people -- in the administration of laws
through the agencies. He said we need a system where the people
12
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can interplay with the government in a way that is effective and
where the people have some power.
Senator Crapo said in the 1991 legislature he introduced
Senate Bill 1006 which would have judicial oversight over agency
decision making. He said there were other bills also introduced
that dealt with the same issue.
The Attorney General requested
that we hold off on those bills inasmuch as he proposed the
appointment of a task force to review the entire administrative
procedures process. Senator Crapo said they agreed with this and
encouraged them to take into consideration some of the feelings
that we were expressing in our proposed legislation, and to some
extent they have done so. He said the areas he was most concerned
with have been ignored completely and that is one of the main
reasons he is concerned about this proposed legislation.
Senator Crapo said one problem we have is that there is not
a tight enough connection between the statutory authority for
rulemaking and the exercise of rulemaking. He said he has seen a
lot of rules promulgated where the statutory authority for the rule
is just a very general statement in the statute. He said somewhere
in the statute there should be something that essentially says:
"Rules may be promulgated by an agency only when specifically
authorized by statute.
No rule shall be valid or enforceable
unless it is specifically authorized by and falls within the intent
and scope of statutory law. 11
He said the legislature has to quit
giving agencies the blanket authority to make rules and regulations
for some very broad statement of policy. He said we can start this
process in the Administrative Procedures Act.
Senator Crapo said he realizes that the legislature cannot
write every detail of every law, and there has to be some authority
for rulemaking, but presently it is way out of balance in terms of
what we've allowed in this state. He said there should be a nexus,
but it should be a rather carefully and tightly controlled nexus.
Senator Crapo said the publication of the Administrative Code
is a fantastic idea. He said he has sometimes spent weeks trying
to find an agency's regulatory authority, and sometimes he never
finds it. He said the people in many of the agencies don't know
where it is.
Senator Crapo said the proposed legislation and the system we
are now working under basically have the concept of limited
judicial review, meaning that the agency gets to decide what
enforcement action to take. They then bring the enforcement action
and the enforcement action is handled by an employee of the agency
or a hearing officer who is paid by the agency. After his decision
is rendered then a court can review it, but the court cannot review
any fact issues beyond determining whether there's been a
reasonable basis in the record determined for those factual
decisions. The court has full review of legal issues.
13
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Senator Crapo said the outcome of that is, frankly, that the
agency is the prosecutor, the judge, the jury, and the executioner.
He said that is why the people are cynical about not getting a fair
shake in front of the agencies. One solution in other states has
been to create some kind of an independent administrative law judge
or a system of administrative law judges who are independent. They
are paid by the state, but they are not paid by the agency.
He
said he does not think this works, and quite frankly he thinks it's
just another new bureaucracy.
Senator Crapo said the concept that he has proposed in Senate
Bill 1006 is to simply takes our old approach but allows the judge
to take additional evidence if he doesn't feel there's enough
evidence from the record before him. The judge is then allowed to
have a de novo review of the facts and the law.
He said some
people feel this will have a monumental impact on more litigation
in the courts. He said he doesn't agree, but if it takes this in
order to protect the citizens of the state of Idaho in terms of
giving them empowerment in their dealings with the agencies, so be
it.
In response to a question by Representative Loveland, Senator
Crapo said he would be in favor of putting a sunset clause in some
statutes in order that the legislature would be forced into
reviewing the statute as well as the rules and regulations.
senator Crapo said the very maximum amount of legislative
oversight that is allowed by constitutional law should be written
into statute. He said this committee should be very certain that
the legislature does not give away one iota of its authority to
review rules a~d regulations.
He said it should not be limited
timewise or any other way. The legislature should have the most
convenient procedures available to it to review the rules and
regulations of the agencies because in one sense the legislature
is the last resort for citizens who have not been able to get some
kind of satisfaction in front of an agency.
Senator Crapo said he was concerned about the definition of
•provision of law" in the proposed draft which reads, "'Provision
of law' me~ns ... an executive order or rule of an administrative
agency. n
He said never in his mind has he thought that an
executive order is a provision of law, nor that a rule or
regulation has the full status of law. He said he was alarmed that
this is being placed in the statute, because in effect it will be
elevating those things to the level of law. He said to him a law
is a statute, not a rule or regulation, although essentially the
rules and regulations have the effect of law.
Senator Crapo said with reference to the creation of the
office of administrative rules coordinator, he is not convinced
that we need to remove this from the state law librarian's office.
He said he doesn't feel we need to create a new agency. He said
14
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if the legislature has oversight of the rules and regulations, and
if we do create a new position, then it should be the legislature
that appoints the position. He said it should not be the governor
and it should not be the code commission. He said if the committee
does not agree with this, and the governor does appoint the person
to that position, then the legislature should at least have advice
and consent in the Senate.
Senator Crapo addressed Section 67-5221, Public Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking. He said this might be a good place to state
that we need a specific statutory nexus b~cause it talks about
identifying specific statutory authority for the rulemaking.
In Section 67-5222(2), Senator Crapo expressed his concern
about the language An opportunity for oral presentation need not
be provided when the agency has no discretion as to the substantive
content of a proposed rule .... 11 He said he is not sure we should
restrict public participation even in those circumstances.
6

Senator Crapo said that Section 67-5224 allows for a rule to
become final when published, or such other day that's specified.
He said in some cases where they're conferring a benefit, there's
no good reason for delay.
He said he also feels that an agency
could make it effective immediately by simply saying that they were
conferring a benefit.
He said that maybe in the final analysis
that concern is not big enough to override the concern that the
agency does need, on occasion, to be able to act immediately, but
he said that this should be looked at very carefully, because the
way it's worded there is no limitation on the agency.
Senator Crapo said that in Section 67-5226, Temporary Rules,
if an agency finds that it is reasonably necessary to protect the
public health, safety, or welfare, or reasonably necessary to
confer a benefit, then they can adopt a temporary rule. He said
this provision is so broad, that we might as well allow an agency
to enact a temporary rule whenever they want, because that's
exactly what that provision says. He said either put no limits on
it, or figure out what we're trying to let happen and define it.
Senator Crapo said that in Section 67-5231, Time Limitation,
it places a statute of limitations on procedural requirements. He
said if there is a limitation, it should be put at 5 or 10 years,
because frequently a rule has to be in effect and operate for a
period of years before the public really understands what's
happening.
In response to a question by senator Hawkins relating to
public notice of rulemaking in a newspaper, Senator Crapo said he
feels that most people are not going to be aware of the biweekly
Administrative Bulletin, and the public is used to looking in the
legal notice section of the newspaper. He said he realizes there
is a cost involved if you' re pub_lishing in both places, but again,
15

October - 402

in terms of fairness of giving true public notice, there should
probably be some kind of public notice in the newspapers. He said
he doesn't feel the entire rule has to be published in the
newspaper; that some type of shortened notice in the newspaper
would probably be adequate.
Mr. Bob Hall, Idaho Newspaper Association, stated he primarily
represents community newspapers and does not represent two or three
of the largest newspapers in the state. Mr. Hall stated that the
Idaho Newspaper Association is in support of the major thrust of
the proposed legislation; i.e. , the gathering and publication
process of administrative rules and regulations into both an
administrative bulletin and an administrative code. He said the
publishing of legal notices in the newspapers accounts for about
$500,000 of legal advertising; nevertheless, he feels that
publishers are wise enough citizens to know when a job can be done
better, at least in terms of codifying the rules and collecting
them in a central place.
Mr. Hall said the current system of publication of notices in
the newspapers has failed in notifying the citizens because it's
a spotty process. He said agencies publish according to a law that
says only that they have to publish in a newspaper or newspapers.
It does not say in every county, in every city. He said there is
no pattern required.
Mr. Hall said the goal of this committee
should be to achieve the maximum penetration to the highest number
of people possible at the most effective cost.
He said there
should be at least some ad or a .m.&1.6. message that will penetrate
at least 70% of the homeowners in a county.
Mr. Hall said the law should provide for a notice that
contains an index of which rules and regulations are being changed,
informs the public of the existence of and what is contained in the
Administrative Bulletin, and where it can find a copy. He said the
notice should be published in a newspaper which is the largest or
most effective in a given county and make sure that it is in every
county in the state. He said this will break the spotty pattern
and will not unreasonably increase the cost.
Mr. Hall said the Idaho Newspaper Association would oppose any
law that does not substitute some reasonable public notification
of the promulgation of rules.
Mr. Hall presented the committee
with a sample of a public notice that would be published in
newspapers prior to the biweekly publication of the Administrative
Bulletin. See Appendix A.
Mr. Hall said he is concerned about the language contained in
Section 67-5205 which states, QOne each to any public library in
this state which requests a copy from the coordinator.• He said
it should be mandatory that every public library receive a copy of
the bulletin. He said it should be mandatory that every city in
the state receive a copy also.
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The committee discussed future meetings of the committee.
Representative Simpson said at the next meeting the committee
should address those areas of concern which individuals have
discussed today.
He requested that members send any proposed
changes to the draft legislation to the Legislative Council in
order that they may be made available to the committee.
The next meeting of
November 12, 1991, in Boise.

the

committee

was

scheduled

for

There being no further business, the meeting adjourned at
3:05 p.m.
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This is a sample of the public notice advertisement to be required to be run in at .least one newspaper of dominant circulation in each county in Idaho to alert the public to the each
new issue of the Idaho Administrative Bulletin and where they
can go to study those Bulletins.
Ad Size: 2 columns x 5 inches
Estimated Annual Cost to cover all counties with notice of
each new Bulletin issue in 40 in-county newspapers: $50,000.00
Estimated 1991 cost for all Rules & Reg "intent to change" and
hearing notices published under current law in 6 daily newspapers used: $200,000.00
Source: Idaho Newspaper Association, Inc.

Public Notice
Of New Or Changed
State Agency Rules
The following public agencies of the State of Idaho
have filed their intent to propose or promulgate Rules
or Regulations that would change that agency's operatiom affecting citizens of this State.

Dept. or Agency

General Subject

Reg.#

FISh & Game
Health & Welfare
Revenue & Taxation
Highways
Industrial Commission
Education

Salmon Fishing
Toxic Waste, Restaurants
Sales Tax, Truckers
Road signs, Intersections
Workmen's Comp Records
School Texts, Primary

33--42
432-15
12-34
57-32
21-76
43-56

Citizens can read the fulle text of, and related agency
procedures on, any of the above proposed rules in the Idaho
Adminstrative Bulletin, at the following locations:
Clerk's Office, Clearwater County Courthouse ,112 First St., Orofino
Orofino City Lfbrary,43 East Rhodes St., Orofino
Pierce City Ubrary, Main Street, Pierce

